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In April 2006, an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle crashed near Nogales, Arizona.  This incident is of interest because it 
triggered one of the most sustained studies into the causes of failure involving such a vehicle.   The National 
Transportation Safety Board together with the US Customs and Border Protection agency under the Department of 
Homeland Security worked to identify lessons learned from this mishap.   The crash at Nogales is also of interest 
because it illustrates an irony of Unmanned Aircraft Systems operations; the increasing reliance on autonomous and 
unmanned operations is increasing the importance of other aspects of human-system interaction in the cause of 
major incidents.   The following pages illustrate this argument using an accident analysis technique, Events and 
Causal Factors charting, to identify the many different ways in which human factors contributed to the loss of this 




The term Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) refers to the airborne component of the wider Unmanned Aircraft 
Systems (UAS’) that support the operation of a growing class of complex, safety-critical applications.  Within the 
US military alone funding for UAS development has increased from $3 billion in the early 1990s to over $12 billion 
for 2004-2009 [1].   It has been estimated that the civil UAS market would reach €100 million (US $129.6 million) 
annually by 2010. This expenditure is intended to support a wide variety of surveillance and reconnaissance 
operations including the monitoring of forest fires, oil spills, contaminant clouds, algae bloom and border security.  
 
The use of UAVs is typically intended to ‘keep humans out of harm’s way’ – until things go wrong.  As early as 
2001 the UAV accident rate was considered significantly higher than that of manned aircraft [2]. However 
Nullmeyer et al note that even within common platforms, different analysts have attributed the same accident data to 
different causes [1]. Their review of Air Force Predator mishaps identified mechanical problems as a significant 
cause although it would seem that mechanical failures are decreasing with improvements in UAS [2].   In contrast, 
attention has begun to focus on human factors issues including shortfalls in individuals’ skill and knowledge 
(checklist error, task mis-prioritization, lack of training for task attempted, and inadequate system knowledge), 
situation awareness (channelized attention), and crew coordination. 
 
This paper illustrates the many different ways in which human intervention determines the success or failure of UAS 
operations.   These include strategic, management decisions that help create the context for both the systems 
engineering and operations teams that monitor and control UAVs.   They also include the regulatory framework that, 
in turn, influences every level of UAS operations.   The complex nature of these applications can make it difficult to 
trace the different interactions between management and regulation, between operational staff and their support 
teams.  It is for this reason that the following pages focus on a single accident involving a Predator Type B UAV.   
The intention is to focus on particular examples of the problems that can arise in the human factors of UAS 
operation in order to illustrate the more general issues that increasingly complicate the use of these safety-critical 
systems. 
 
Overview of the Nogales Predator Mishap 
 
In the early hours of 25th April, 2006, a Predator Type B UAV manufactured by General Atomics Aeronautical 
Systems, Inc. (GA-ASI), crashed northwest of Nogales International Airport, Arizona.  Although it landed in a 
sparsely populated residential area, there were no injuries but there was substantial damage to the aircraft. The UAV 
was owned by the US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) agency but at the time of the crash was being operated 
under contract with GA-ASI.  This commercial relationship is explained by the CBP’s requirement to rapidly 
increase their use of unmanned surveillance aircraft to improve security along the United States’ southern borders.   
 The Predator B is a turboprop aircraft with redundant, fault-tolerant avionics.  It can be flown by a remote pilot or 
autonomously.  It was designed as a long-endurance, high-altitude platform with a wingspan of 66 feet, a maximum 
weight of 10,000 pounds and a maximum speed above 220 knots. The National Transportation Safety Board 
(NTSB) coordinated the immediate investigation of the mishap [3].  They argued that the loss of the Predator was 
caused by the pilot’s failure to use an appropriate checklist when switching control from one pilot payload operator 
position (PPO-1) to another (PPO-2).   In making this change, he forgot to alter the position of the controls in the 
new position.  This resulted in the fuel valve inadvertently being shut off, which in turn starved the engine.    The 
decision to focus on this mishap is justified by the level of detail provided by the NTSB account.  It is also 
motivated by the manner in which regulatory and organizational factors contributed to the context in which the 
operator ‘error’ was likely to jeopardize mission success. 
 
Mapping Out the Context of the Nogales Mishap 
 
Figure 1 uses a simple graphical formalism to map out the loss of the Predator.   Events and Causal Factors (ECF) 
diagrams were originally developed by the US Department of Energy. It is important to stress, however, that this is 
only one of several different notations that might be used to provide a similar overview.    Events are represented as 
rectangles.  For example, the pilot’s discovery that the PPO-1 console had locked-up, in turn, led him to transfer 
control to the second PPO-2 position.  The prefix numbers in each event denote the page in the NTSB (2007) report 
where evidence is provided about these observations.   Where an event is labelled ‘Assum’ then the analysts have 
introduced assumptions into their model which should be subject to further analysis as part of subsequent 
investigations.   This initial transfer of control led to the fuel supply being cut.  The PPO levers were used to 
perform different functions depending on whether PPO-1 or PPO-2 was being used to control the aircraft.  If PPO-1 
controls flight then the condition lever for PPO-2 controls the iris setting for the on-board camera.  However, if 
control is transferred from PPO-1 to PPO-2 then this lever is used to open and close the fuel valve.  It is, therefore, 
critical that pilots alter the position of these levers from the previous camera setting to an appropriate fuel valve 
position before moving flight control from PPO-1 to PPO-2. 
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Figure 1: Preliminary Overview of UAV Crash 
 
Figure 1 also includes the conditions that make particular events more likely.   These are denoted by ovals.   In this 
example, the pilot did not consult the procedural checklist associated with console failures and this contributed to his 
‘error’ in not ensuring that the control levers had the same settings when they moved to PPO-2.  Figure 1 only 
provides an initial overview of the immediate events surrounding the loss of the Predator.  It does not explain the 
reasons the pilot failed to consult an appropriate checklist nor does it consider the factors that contributed to the 
failure of the PPO-1 console in the first place. These are important omissions; several of the previous studies in this 
 area have been content simply to identify the frequency of operator error or of maintenance failure in UAV incidents 
without taking the analysis any further.  This results in forms of analysis that are often superficial and which fail to 
reflect the wider lessons that can be learned from those mishaps that have occurred.   To avoid such a superficial 
analysis, Figure 2 extends the previous ECF diagram to consider the contributory factors that indirectly led to the 
problems with the PPO-1 control position.  One important factor was a culture in which ‘work arounds’ were 
routinely accepted to enable safety-critical operations to continue.  Previous papers have emphasised the hazards 
associated with long term acceptance of ‘degraded modes of operation’ [4].   Maintenance procedures were often 
poorly documented and so there was a lack of information about the corrective actions that were taken following 
nine previous ‘lock up’ failures in the three months before this incident.  The high number of previous failures and 
the inadequate maintenance actions may also have reflected deeper problems in the risk assessment practices that 
were intended to guide the operation of the CBP UAS programme.  As can be seen in figure, these diverse 
contributory factors can all be associated with the CBP’s dual role both in operating the missions and in regulating 
the programme.   Security considerations partly justify the FAA’s delegation of regulatory responsibility through the 
CBP’s certificate of authorisation.   It can be argued that an independent regulator might have been more proactive 
in address the safety management concerns that are summarised in the contributory factors of Figure 2. 
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Figure 2: Contextual Factors Leading to the PPO-1 ‘Lock-Up’ and the Initial Pilot ‘Error’ 
 
Figure 2 also provides a high-level overview of the factors that contributed to the failure to follow a recommended 
checklist when the PPO-1 control position locked-up.  In this case, specific links are drawn from the more general 
cluster of contributory factors.   The CBP did not set specific flying time requirements for particular models of 
UAV.   At the time of the accident, the sole pilot in charge of the ground control system had only 27 hours of 
 experience on the Predator B.  This arguably was insufficient for him to be familiar with detailed emergency 
procedures even though he had more than 500 hours on the simpler Predator A.   This argument provides an indirect 
explanation for the failure to use an emergency check-list.   Given his lack of experience with the platform, the pilot 
contacted an instructor over the telephone.  He may have assumed that this was sufficient given that he was already 
operating under higher levels of workload as he struggled to find a work-around from the failure to PPO-1. 
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Figure 3: Recovery Problems after Initial Problems Noticed 
 
The opening sections of this paper described how the Predator Type B can be flow either autonomously or under 
direct control from the ground based pilot.  One of the benefits of using this mixed approach is the flexibility that is 
provided by enabling operators to intervene and respond during degraded modes of operation.  It is for this reason 
that Figure 3 focuses on the attempts by the two-person ground control team to both diagnose and then resolve the 
immediate problem that arose when the transfer of working positions triggered fuel starvation to the UAV’s engines.  
In particular, the bottom right contributory factors denote that the PPO-2 displays remained configured for the 
camera operator.   This may have prevented the pilot from observing the engine monitoring data that was indicating 
a fuel starvation problem.   The reason for this was that under normal operation the camera operator would have no 
need for the engine data.  The high operational workload involved in the transfer of positions following the ‘lock up’ 
of PPO-1 and the failure to use a recommended checklist also help to explain the failure to successfully reconfigure 
the displays as the pilot began operations from PPO-2.  Equally, research in interface design has shown that detailed 
development decisions in the Human-Machine Interface (HMI) for UAS applications contributed to the pilots 
problems.  Similar systems have been developed to automatically configure displays whenever there is a change in 
controller position.   If this had been available at the time of this Predator mishap then the pilot need not have been 
required to explicitly reconfigure the PPO-2 display to present essential engine management data. 
 
Figure 4 continues this analysis of the HMI issues that contributed to the Nogales UAS mishap.  It records the 
observation that engine data and fault annunciations were presented on the left heads down display areas for both 
PPO-1 and PPO-2.   However, this information was integrated with a mass of other parameters and that this may 
have contributed to the pilot’s uncertainty over the cause of the UAV’s loss of altitude.   There was no unique aural 
alert for the loss of thrust.  The reliance on non-specific alerts removed an additional cue that might have prompted 
the crew to look in this area of their displays.  The problems of information presentation and filtering combined with 
the high workload, noted in previous sections, to undermine the situation awareness of the pilot as they struggled to 
understand the UAV’s loss of altitude.   This was compounded by a concern that PPO-2 might also lock-up 
following the failure of the pilot’s initial work station.  This was a significant concern given that previous failures 
had been resolved by swapping the circuit cards between the work stations – increasing the chance of future 
 problems with the secondary control position.  The PPO-2 head-up display was not being updated as the pilot 
struggled to diagnose the underlying causes of the problems with the Predator. 
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Figure 4: HMI Issues Connected to Recovery Problems 
 
The pilot’s problems were compounded by the immediate consequences of the loss in altitude once fuel had been cut 
to the engines of the UAV.  Once direct data communications with the aircraft have been cut, the UAV follows a 
pre-programmed, autonomous flight-path known as the ‘Lost Link Mission Profile’.  This is intended to provide 
pilots and technicians with an interval of time during which they can take steps to restore the line of sight data link 
to the UAV.   Figure 5 summarises the problems in tracing the vehicle’s movements on the lost link profile. 
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Figure 5: Lost-Link Mission Profile Issues 
 
As can be seen, one of the pilots is responsible for programming the lost link altitude at the start of the mission.  The 
exact nature of this route is considered to be security sensitive by the CBP.   However, this creates a number of 
problems given the lack of external regulatory oversight that might otherwise be expected for such a critical routing.  
There was no standardised form of risk assessment to consider the possible consequences and likelihood of collision 
 with ground obstacles, including conurbations, during the planning of lost link profiles.  Subsequent investigations 
concluded that the profiles did not adequately identify ‘safe zones’ where a UAV could ditch as it followed the lost 
link manoeuvres.  These factors were compounded by the pilots’ lack of experience and expertise in tracing the 
probable course of a UAV as it followed one of these profiles.   They were, typically, unaware of the complex set of 
trajectories that were used to help re-establish data ink communications.   This in turn may explain why the pilot in 
this accident failed to understand the importance of modifying the lost link altitude setting if the UAV was operated 
away from the original mission area.   This was important if the vehicle was to have sufficient altitude to avoid 
descending outside temporary flight restriction (TFR) airspace.   The term TFR is used to describe an area in which 
other aircraft can only enter if they explicitly contact Air Traffic Controllers; the intention is to minimise any 
potential conflicts with unmanned or autonomous vehicles.  This accident illustrates how the regulations and 
procedures governing the air traffic management of UAVs are in a state of flux – it seems clear that many of the 
assumptions that govern the operation of existing airspace can have dangerous consequences with this new 
generation of systems.  The loss of altitude had further consequences, not only did it lead to an incursion beyond the 
TFR but it also created further problems as attempts were made to re-establish data link communications. 
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Figure 6: Loss of Electrical Power and Engine Restart Capability 
 
Figure 6 summarises the knock-on effects that exacerbated the initial problems created by the loss of engine power 
to the Predator.   This ECF diagram extends the previous analysis to consider the interaction between the pilot and 
other stakeholders, including local Air Traffic Management.  After the Predator lost engine power, it began to rely 
on battery reserves.  This triggered the UAV to shut down satellite communications, increasing the importance of re-
establishing the line of sight data links.   The aircraft also responded to the loss of engine power by disabling the 
transponder that Air Traffic Management systems used to track the UAV.   The pilot could not immediately see 
 whether or not the transponder was still working.   Fortunately, Air Traffic Management staff contacted the pilot to 
determine whether or not he could explain the sudden loss of contact with the Predator.  This and subsequent 
interactions between the ATM and CBP staff were compromised by a number of long standing problems.  In 
particular, ATM staff were not provided with detailed information about the lost link profiles used by the UAVs.  It 
is unclear whether this lack of communication was justified by security concerns or was the result of underlying 
problems in inter-agency coordination.  In either case, the pilot failed to inform the ATC officer that the aircraft 
might have descended below the TFR and out of controlled airspace.  The lack of coordination and of regular 
exercises for emergencies involving UAV platforms may also explain why the pilot and his co-workers did not seek 
assistance from the Western Area Defence Sector which had a range of systems for tracking the UAV in the minutes 
before it came down in a residential area. 
 
 
Conclusions and Further Work 
 
In April 2006, an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle crashed near Nogales, Arizona.  This incident is of interest because it 
triggered one of the most sustained studies into the causes of failure involving a UAS.   The National Transportation 
Safety Board together with the US Customs and Border Protection agency under the Department of Homeland 
Security worked to identify lessons learned from this mishap.   The crash at Nogales is also of interest because it 
illustrates an irony of UAV operations; the increasing reliance on autonomous and unmanned operations is 
increasing the importance of other aspects of human-system interaction in the cause of major incidents.   This paper 
has used an accident analysis technique, Events and Causal Factors charting, to identify the many different ways in 
which human factors contributed to the loss of this Predator B aircraft.   
 
We have seen how the pilot failed to use an approved procedure when responding to a ‘lock up’ in the PPO-1 
console.  In consequence, a control lever on the alternate PPO-2 workstation was left in a position that was 
appropriate for its previous use as a camera console but which was interpreted as a command to close the engine fuel 
valve when the pilot designated PPO-2 as the new flight control interface.   Although the use of an approved 
checklist or procedure might have helped the pilot to identify the need to reset the PPO-2 control levers, it is 
important not to ignore the systemic causes of this incident.  In particular, the lack of adequate maintenance 
management systems meant that little attempt had been made to resolve previous incidents in which the control 
systems had frozen. Instead, operators began to form a culture of ‘making do’ or of finding ‘work arounds’ to 
degraded modes of operation.  This included the swapping of ‘failed’ circuit boards between the PPO-1 and PPO-2 
positions.  In such circumstances, it was highly likely that these ad hoc strategies would eventually fail to ensure 
safe and successful operation of the UAV platform. 
 
We have also seen how human intervention played a critical role in emergency response even after the Predator 
went into fully autonomous flight. The lack of coordination and emergency planning between the CBP, Air Traffic 
Management and organisations including the Western Area Defence Sector was exposed in the minutes after contact 
was lost.   Not only was it difficult for ATM personnel to identify the risks of possible incursions as the UAV 
strayed beyond the TFR zone, the pilot had insufficient knowledge about the lost link profile that he could not 
provide the detail that they needed.   This mishap revealed a pressing need for safety management structures to be 
used beyond the design phases involved in UAV construction.  It revealed the importance of adequate incident 
reporting and of accurate maintenance logs during operational service.  It also illustrated the need for structured risk 
assessment techniques to inform detailed mission planning, in particular to guide the identification of ‘crash zones’ 
within lost link profiles.   
 
We would argue that further work needs to focus on two key areas – degraded modes of operation and contingency 
planning.  ‘Degraded modes of operation’ describes failures of critical components that can gradually erode safety 
margins but which need not prevent an application from being used to achieve its intended function.  In other words, 
operators can find ‘work arounds’ that get the job done but which may also threaten the safety of operators and the 
general public.  In contrast, contingency operations refer to the response that organisations plan for the total failure 
of a safety-critical control system.  It can be argued that because UAV’s do not carry aircrew, there has been a 
temptation to find work-arounds that would never be allowed within other areas of aviation.   The ‘hot swapping’ of 
a failed circuit board between operational avionics systems is not recommended practice in most airlines but has 
been described in several UAV incidents. Similarly, it might be argued that an undue level of complacency has also 
 undermined contingency planning within these operations.  Too little thought is often given to the coordination that 




1. R.T. Nullmeyer, G.A. Montijo, R. Herz, R. Leonik, Birds of Prey: Training Solutions to Human Factors Issues, 
The Interservice/Industry Training, Simulation & Education Conference (I/ITSEC), 2007. 
 
2 K.W. Williams, A Summary of Unmanned Aircraft Accident/Incident Data: Human Factors Implications. 
(December 2004), DOT/FAA/AM-04/24, Office of Aerospace Medicine. 
 
3 NTSB, Safety recommendation A-07-70 through -86: Loss of a Type—B Predator 10 nautical miles northwest of 
Nogales International Airport, Nogales, Arizona, April 25, 2006.   Washington DC, USA, October 2007. 
 
4. C.W. Johnson and C. Shea, The Contribution of Degraded Modes of Operation as a Cause of Incidents and 
Accidents in Air Traffic Management.  In Proceedings of the 2007 International Systems Safety Society Conference, 




Chris.W. Johnson, DPhil, MA, MSc, FBCS, CEng, CITP, Department of Computing Science, University of 
Glasgow, Glasgow, G12 8RZ, Scotland, UK, telephone +44 (141) 330 6053, facsimile +44 (141) 330 4913, e-mail – 
Johnson@dcs.gla.ac.uk, web page http://www.dcs.gla.ac.uk/~johnson 
 
Chris Johnson is Professor of Computing Science at the University of Glasgow in Scotland.  He heads a small 
research group devoted to improving the reporting and analysis of incidents and accidents across safety-critical 
domains ranging from healthcare, to the military to aviation and rail. 
 
Christine Shea, M Ed, PhD, ESR Technology Ltd, Whittle House, Birchwood Park, Warrington, Cheshire, WA3 
6FW. E-mail - christine.shea@esrtechnology.com 
 
Christine Shea is a principal consultant in safety and risk management with ESR Technology. Her work involves the 
management of risk in complex, safety-critical domains including aviation, rail, the petroleum industry and health 
care. Her research interests include the management and organisation of work in safety critical domains, safety 
culture, the development and implementation of incident reporting systems and human error. 
 
 
